Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 1 | Issue 1

Article 9

1910

Judicial Decisions on Criminal Law and Procedure

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal
Justice Commons
Recommended Citation
Judicial Decisions on Criminal Law and Procedure, 1 J. Am. Inst. Crim. L. & Criminology 137 (May 1910 to March 1911)

This Criminal Law is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS ON CRIMINAL LAW AND
PROCEDURE.'
RECENT

I.

CRIMINAL CASES.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

Hack vs. State, Wis., 124 N. W. 492. I. Arraignment and Plea.
Arraignment and plea being essential to due process of law guaranteed by
Const. Amend. U. S. 14, a state may not pass a law providing for trial
without arraignment or plea. 2. Rights of Accused. One accused of a
lesser crime, or misdemeanor, waives a right for which he does not ask at
the time of trial.
II.

CRUEL AND

UNUSUAL

PUNISHMENT.

State vs. Ross, Ore., lO6 Pac. 1022. A fine which the defendant was
unable to pay during a lifetime of effort, although within the maximum of
the statute, is a cruel and unusual punishment within the prohibition of the
Constitution.
III.

PAROLE.
State vs. Collins, Mo., 125 S. W. 465.
Statutes. Providing for the
parole of prisoners and the termination thereof, without further hearing, in
the discretion of the court or judge granting the same, is constitutional.
People ex rel. vs. Strassheim, Ill., go N. E. 118. I. Parole Law. Relator
was paroled and re-imprisoned on the ground that he had forfeited his parole
by violating the regulations. Held, that, under section 4 (authorizing the warden to re-imprison any paroled prisoner), a paroled prisoner was entitled to a
hearing before the board of pardons as to whether he had violated his
parole, and hence such section did not deprive relator of his liberty without
due process of law, as it would have done had he not been entitled to a
hearing. 2. Legal Custody. Under the direct provisions of the parole act,
as well as in absence thereof, paroled prisoners remain in the legal custody
of the penitentiary warden.
State vs. Smith, Ind., go N. E. 607. Suspension of Sentence. A statute authorizing the court, on the entry of judgment of conviction, to
suspend sentence and parole the person convicted by order duly entered of
record as a part of the judgment in the case, etc., does not authorize courts
to suspend sentence and parole persons after the rendition of final judgment, and an order suspending the collection of a fine made after the
entry of final judgment of conviction is erroneous.
IV.

JUVENILE COUmTS.
State vs. Ragan, La., 51 So. 89.
I. Organization. An amendment
to the Constitution created a special juvenile court in the parish of Orleans,
and provided that district courts outside of said parish should hold separate
1
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sessions as juvenile courts. No organization of district courts as juvenile
courts is required, and such sessions of district courts may be held without
the appointment of a "probation officer." 2. Sessions. Sessions of a juvenile
court in the country parishes must be held apart, and a separate record kept
of the proceedings. 3. Delinquents. Children are' proceeded against as delinquents for the sole purpose of reformation, and cannot be prosecuted for
crime for the purpose of punishment, except, perhaps, in capital cases.
V.

INSANITY.
People vs. Oppenheimer, Cal., io6 Pac. 74. I. Evidence. Evidence as
to confinement subsequent to the commission of the assault is not evidence
of the condition of defendant's mind at the time of the assault. . . . Evidence by non-experts as to whether some persons confined in incorrigible
cells had not become insane while so confined, is inadmissible. 2. Sufficiency.
Defendant in order to show insanity, must show such insanity by a preponderance of evidence.
People vs. Brent, Cal., App., io6 Pac. IiO. I. Evidence or Mental Condition. When mental condition of an individual at a particular time is in issue,
conduct, acts and declarations, after as well as before the time in question, are
admissible, if sufficiently near in point of time, and if they appear to have
any tendency to show what that mental condition was at the time in issue;
but the admissibility of statements made by accused before and after the
commission of the crime, and offered to show insanity, is very much in the
discretion of the trial court.
VI.

PARTIES

TO

CRIME.

People vs Giro, New York, go N. E. 432. I. Liability. Where two
persons acting together armed themselves and broke into a dwelling to rob
it, and were, when discovered, engaged, one in robbing the house and the
other in watching, and one of them killed an occupant of the dwelling in
their attempt to escape, both were guilty of murder in the first degree, as
all that they did was in furtherance of their original design to rob.
VII. INTENT.
Heath vs. State, Ind., go N. E. 31o. Erroneous Belief as to Age. An
erroneous belief as to the age of the girl, however well founded, is not a
defense to a prosecution for rape, if she was in fact within the prohibited age.
VIII.

JURISDICTION.

People vs. Poindexter, Ill., go N. E. 261. 'Conspiracy. A conspiracy,
which is a misdemeanor, formed in one state, to commit a felony, does not
merge in the felony committed in another state, so as to prevent conviction
of the conspiracy in the first state.
IX. CONSENT.
State vs. Allison, S. D., I24 N. W. 747. Rape. A female under I8 cannot
consent to indecent liberties with her person, accompanied with intent to have
intercourse, and thus make that not an assault with intent to rape, which
would have been such an assault if without her consent.
X.

SELF-DEFENSE.

State vs. Driggers, S. C., 66 S. E. 1042. Self-Defense. When, after
abcused and decedent had started home after the quarrel had ended, accused,
while in no peril, shot decedent, there was no issue of self-defense.
138 .
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Wheatley vs. State, Ark., 125 S. W. 414. I. Self-Defense. 2. Necessity of Act. One in resisting an assault in the course of a sudden quarrel
is not justified in killing the assailant, unless he is so endangered by the
assault as to make it necessary to kill to save his own life or prevent a
great bodily injury, and unless he employs all the means in his power, consistent with that of safety, to avoid the danger and avert the necessity of
the killing. 3. Apprehension of Danger. One justified in acting on appearances, and killing his assailant to save his own life, must honestly believe,
without carelessness on his part, that the danger is so urgent that it is necessary to kill his assailant in order to save his own life, or to prevent a great
bodily injury, and he must act with due circumspection; and, where there
is no danger, and his belief of the existence thereol is imputable to negligence, he is not excused. 4. Provoking Attack. One speaking opprobrious
words is not precluded from acting in self-defense, unless he uses them for
the purpose of bringing on an attack and an opportunity of killing the percon pifovoked, or to do him great bodily injury. 5. Withdrawal. One may
not intentionally provoke an attack and slay his assailant and rely on selfdefense, and before he can do so, he must in good faith withdraw from the
combat as far as he can, and do all in his power to avoid the danger and
avert the necessity of the killing. 6. Defense of Another. A person may
lawfully do for his brother when threatened with death or great bodily injury, what he can lawfully do for himself under the same circumstances.
XI.

MANSLAUGHTER.

Leonard vs. State, Ga., 66 S. E. 251.
I. Involuntary Manslaughter.
The evidence for the state making a case of murder by intentionally point.ng a pistol at and shooting at another, and that for the defendant tending
to show an accidental killing, it was not error, to instruct the jury only on
the law of involuntary manslaughter in the performance of an unlawful act;
the court having also charged on the subject of accidental killing, which
would require a verdict of not guilty. 2. Involuntary Manslaughter in Performance of Unlawful Act. Death from the accidental discharge of a pistol
while being unlawfully pointed, renders the accused, if not guilty of murder,
then of involuntary manslaughter.

XII. LARCENY.
Brewer vs. State, Ark., 125 S. W. 127. I. Elements of Offense. A
finder of lost goods* is not guilty of larceny thereof, where he had no
felonious intent to withhold them from the owner at the time they were
found, though he afterward appropriated them to his own use. 2. Instruclions. A request to charge that if defendant found prosecutor's pocketbook,
and either knew, or ascertained, to whom it belonged, and on demand of the
owner denied having it, or did not voluntarily return it to him, he would
be guilty of larceny, was erroneous as eliminating the idea of good faith
in making inquiry for the owner, or the absence of a felonious intent at the
time of the original taking. An instruction that if defendant found prosecutor's pocketbook, and contents, and within a reasonable time thereafter made
inquiry as to the ownership thereof, defendant was not guilty of larceny as
charged, unless "he knew, or soon learned, who the owner was, and denied
having it," was rendered erroneous by the addition of such quoted clause.
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XIII. INDICTMENT, EVIDENCE AND TRIAL.
Mills vs. State, Fla., 51 So. 278. I. Indictment and Information. An
indictment charging the crime substantially in the language of the statute will
be adjudged good, unless it becomes necessary to state the circumstances
which constitute the definition of the offense charged in order to advise the
prisoner of the nature of the charge against him. 2. Quashing. An indictment will not be quashed or judgment arrested on account of any defect
in the form of the indictment, unless the court is of the opinion that the
indictment is so vague, indistinct and indefinite as to mislead the accused
and embarrass him in the preparation of his defense, or expose him after
conviction or acquital to substantial danger of a new prosecution for the
same offense. 3. Certainty Required. The requisite degree of certainty
in an indictment must have reference to the matter to be charged, and the
manner of form of charging it. Objections to the sufficiency of the indictment cannot be made by objecting to the evidence in support of it. A
motion in arrest of judgment will not lie for the improper admission or
exclusion of evidence.
State vs. Jeanisse, La., 51 So. 290. Error or Informality. Until a verdict is received and recorded, there is no verdictf and the jury have the right
to alter it. Informality in the rendition of a verdict, is waived by the failure of the defendants to object and except at the time, and the defendants
here were not prejudiced by the alleged irregularity in the proceedings.
Gragg vs. State, Okla., .1o6 Pac. 350.' Sufllciency. It is not imperative
under the laws of this state that an information shall contain the words "by
the authority of the state of Oklahoma," if the record discloses that the
prosecution is in fact by the authority of the legal representative of the
state authorized to prosecute.
Nicholson vs. State, Wyo., lo6 Pac. 929. Charge. Rev. St. 1899, 5273,
provides that an information may be filed without a preliminary examination,
whenever an offense shall be charged immediately preceding the first day of
a regular term of court of the county wherein such offense is charged to
have been committed. Held, that the filing of the information constitutes the
"charge," where there has been no prior proceeding, and that the thirty days
are to be computed from the date of preferring the charge, and not from
the date of the commission of the offense.
I. Evidence. To ,justify a
People vs. Leavens, Cal., io6 Pac. 11o3.
conviction of obtaining money by false pretenses by the sale of fraudulent
certificates of stock represented by accused to be owned by him, the prosecution must prove that accused obtained the money on the representation that
he was the owner of the stock which he sold, and that such representation
was false. By statute a conviction cannot be had on the testimony of an
accomplice unless he is corroborated by other evidence tending to connect
accused with the commission of the offense, but evidence outside of that of
the accomplice need not be sufficient to establish the guilt of accused, but it
must in some way tend to implicate and connect him with the crime.
Testimony of Accomplice. The actual commission of an offense may be
2.
established by the evidence of an accomplice. There is no variance between
the allegation in an information for false pretenses that accused procured
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money from prosecutor and the proof that he procured money by means
of a check which prosecutor drew.
Burge vs. State, Ga., 66 S. E. 243." 1. Abandonment. Grounds of a
motion for new trial, which are not referred to in the brief of the counsel
for the plaintiff in error, will be considered as abandoned. 2. New Trial.
Applications for new trial on the grounds of newly discovered evidence are
not favored, and should be supported by the affidavits of the witnesses by
whom the new facts are to be proved, and it must also appear that the newly
discovered evidence is not cumulative only, nor solely to impeach the credit
of a witness, and that the probable effect thereof, if another trial be had,
will be to produce a different verdict.
Sedlack vs. State, Vis., 124 N. W. 510. I. Conclusiveness. A conviction by an impartial jury, sustained by credible evidence and approved
by the presiding judge, is conclusive on appeal, though there is much to
discredit the evidence. 2. Misconduct of Jury. The remark of the clerk
of the court made to the jury in passing through the courtroom in the
morning in charge of an officer, after deliberating all night, that their beds
were made up for the night, and the reply of a juror that he thought the
jury would be out before night, did not constitute prejudicial misconduct.
State vs. Fowler, N. C., 66 S. E. 243. Presumptions. Where the
killing with a deadly weapon was established, or admitted, and the plea was
self-defense, the two presumptions that the killing was unlawful and that it
was done with malice arose, and, where accused merely rebutted the presumption of malice, the presumption that the killing was unlawful, stood, and
justified a conviction of "manslaughter," which becomes "murder in the
second degree" when it has the added element malice.
Sapir et al. vs. United States, 174 Fed. 219.
Evidence of Similar
Offenses. In a prosecution for knowingly receiving property stolen from a
navy yard of the United -States, on the question of knowledge, evidence is
admissible to show that the defendant had received and purchased articles
of the same general character stolen from such navy yard at other times.
Walsh vs. United States, 174 Fed. 615.
I. Other Offenses as Evidence of Intent. Where fraudulent intent is an essential element of the
offense charged, evidence of other acts of the defendant of a kindred nature
are competent to illustrate the character of the transaction in question and
throw light on the intent with which this particular act was done. 2. Inconsistent Findings. Where the gravamen of the charge in several counts 6f
an indictment is the same, a verdict of guilty on each is not inconsistent because they differ in respect to immaterial particulars concerning the means
by which the crime was committed. 3. Impeachnient by Juror." A .juror
,n a criminal case cannot afterward impeach a verdict in which he joined.
Morse vs. United States, 174 Fed. 539. I. Harmless Error. An error
in an instruction applying to certain counts only of the indictment does not
warrant a reversal, where there was a verdict of guilty also on other counts
not affected by such instruction, which is sufficient to support the judgfient.
2. Making False Entries. Upon a charge against an officer of a national
bank of making false entries in the books of the bank, it is immaterial
whether defendant made the entries in person or caused them to be made by
a clerk or bookkeeper. 3. Instructions. In the prosecution of defendants,
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charged as officers with having made false entries in the books of a National
Bank, and in reports to the Comptroller, with intent to injure and defraud
the bank and deceive its officers and the examiner, it was not error to charge
the jury that, if they found that such false entries were made, they were
authorized to presume therefrom, in the absence of any explanation, that
defendants knew them to be false, and that, if the natural and probable consequence of such entries was to defraud or deceive, they might presume,
in the absence of explanation, that such was defendant's intention.
1. Cross-Examination of
Placker vs. State. Tex., 125 S. W. 409.
Accused. In a prosecution for theft, where defendant sought to explain his
possession of three $5 bills by testimony that one S. gave him four $5
bills, and he gave one of them back a day or two before the alleged offense,
it was proper to allow the state to show by the witness that the money
paid was won in a card game. 2. Remarks of Judge. It was error for
the court to remark, in overruling defendant's objections to a question, that
it was the most material question that had been asked by the state.
Parker vs. State, Ala., 51 So. 26o. i. Variance in Names. The name of
G. C. Ahhatt was drawn as juror and the list of jurors served on defendant
contained that name when no such person was found and G. C. Abbott was
the person really summoned; this would not affect the validity of the venire;
the name drawn being the same as that in the list served. 2. Admissibility.
A statement made about 4 or 5 o'clock in the evening before the morning
deceased died, in which he said several times that he suffered very much and
could not live, was made under a sense of impending death, and was admissible as a dying declaration. 3. Opinion Evidence. A question in a homicide case as to whether witness or another was in a better position to see
the -difficulty was properly excluded as calling for witness' opinion.
Palmer vs. State, Ala., 51 So. 358. 1. Continuance. To fasten error
on the court as denying accused his constitutional right to compulsory 'rocess
for obtaining witness, it must appear that the application was seasonably
made, and accompanied by a showing as to what the absent witness is expected to testify. 2. Accomplice. On a prosecution for adultery, .the age of
the female is a matter of importance, as if she was over the age of consent
at the time of intercourse, she was particeps criminis, if she consented, so
that no conviction could be had on her uncorroborated testimony. 3. Exception to Hearsay Rule. Testimony of witness on a prosecution for adultery
that her daughter on the evening after the morning on which she gave birth
to a child, stated defendant was the father, is not within the exception to the
rule against hearsay that birth, age, relationship, marriage, death, and legitimacy, when involved in a question of pedigree, may be shown by the declarations of relatives since deceased, made before the controversy arose.
Barnett vs. State, Ala., 51 So. 299. Admissibility. In a prosecution
for homicide by shooting, it was proper to allow the clothes which decedent
was wearing when killed, to be exhibited to the jury, showing the location
of the shot. 2. Character. In a prosecution for homicide, where defendant
testified, the state was properly allowed to introduce evidence as to his general character, and it is proper to ask witness on cross-examination, if he had
not heard that prior to the shooting, defendant had a difficulty with the party
on the road and shot him. 3. Remarks of Counsel. In a prosecution for
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homicide, it is not permissible for counsel to comment on the failure to
examine a witness who was accessible to both parties.
Thomas vs. State, Tex., 125 S. W. 35. I. Presumptions as to :Intent.
Though it is a legal maxim that every one is presumed to intend whatever
would be the reasonable or probable result of his act and the means used
by him, it is never permissible to so instruct the jury, as defendant is entitled to reasonable doubt in every phase of the case. 2. Instruction as to
Murder in First Degree. Where the evidence shows a homicide by a blow
struck in a sudden heat of passion, without any former ill will or premeditated design to kill, an instruction on murder in the first degree should
not be given.
Nelson vs. State, Okla., io6 Pac. 647.
I. Dying Declarations. Dying
declarations are admissible on a trial for murder as to the fact of the
homicide and the person by whom it was committed when made under the
belief of certainty of death. 2. Credibility. For the purpose of affecting the
credibility of a witness he may be asked, on cross-examination, if he has
been convicted of a felony or of any crime which involves moral turpitude;
but it is prejudicial error to ask such witness if he has been indicted, arrested, or imprisoned for a misdemeanor, of if he has been charged or
arrested, or imprisoned, before conviction, for any offense whatever.
People vs. Argentos, Cal., io6 Pac. 65. I. Evidence. 2. Other -Offenses. On a trial for a particular crime, evidence which shows, or tends
to show, the commission of another distinct offense by accused, is, in general, inadmissible, but where evidence has a direct bearing on the question
of guilt, it is admissible, though it tends to show the commission of another
offense. 3. Accusation. The rule that evidence showing a distinct offense
other than that for which accused is being tried is inadmissible extends to
Tproof of an accusation of another crime, as well as to evidence of its actual
commission. 4. Motive. Evidence showing that defendant was accused- of
another offense for which he had given bail with decedent as surety was admissible to show motive.
State vs. Johnson, S. D., 124 N. W., 847.- I. Appointment of Counsel
to Assist State's Attorney. A statute authorizing the court to appoint an
attorney to perform , temporarily the duties required of the state's attorney,
when in the court's opinion the ends of justice would be promoted thereby,
confers upon the court authority to appoint an attorney to assist the state's
attorney in a trial where, in its opinion, justice requires. 2. Selection of Jury.
Error, if any, in overruling challenges for bias to two jurors cannot be held
prejudicial where accused did not exercise any of his three peremptory
challenges. 3. Admonishing Jutry. The record being silent whether the court
admonished the jury, upon separation at a noon recess, not to converse among
themselves, etc., it will be presumed, in the absence of a contrary showing,
that the court performed its duty and gave the proper admonition. 4. Judgnent. Where neither the amount of costs is specified in a judgment, nor
the number of days of imprisonment therefor, such portion of the judgment
is void for indefiniteness. 5. Indictment and Information. An information
for keeping and maintaining gambling apparatus need not designate the town
or building in which the offense was committed.'
C. H. H.
'A digest of the State statutes ior 19o9 will appear in the July issue of
the
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